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I. INTRODUCTION
For most Americans today, bank accounts,
credit cards, and insurance policies are necessi-
ties. When an individual applies for one of these
items, it is necessary to provide a great deal of in-
formation to these institutions.1 The information
ranges from the individual's name, address, tele-
phone number, and Social Security number to, in
some circumstances, income and medical his-
tory.2 What that individual does not realize, if she
did not read the financial institutions' privacy pol-
icy very closely, is that these institutions may share
or sell that information to telemarketers and pro-
filing companies.3 The individual who wishes to
have a bank account may therefore be, in effect,
required to trade her privacy in order to obtain
the necessary services. 4
This paper examines the development of pri-
vacy and the new threats to informational privacy
created by new technologies and computers that
aid in the collection and dissemination of infor-
mation. Part III examines the Financial Services
Modernization Act and the privacy regulations es-
tablished therein. This paper considers whether
the Act is effective in protecting consumers' confi-
dential financial information from misuse. The
I Brandon McKelvey, Financial Institutions' Duty of Confi-
dentiality to Keep Customer's Personal Information Secure From the
Threat of Identity Theft, U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1077, 1078 (2001)
[hereinafter McKelvey].
2 See Jane Bryant Quinn, Your Money is Safer Than Your
Privacy, WASH. POST, July 22, 1999, at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/quinn/columns/0722
99.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Quinn, Money
is Safer Than Your Privacy]; see also McKelvey, supra note 1, at
1078.
3 Jane Bryant Quinn, New Privacy Law Gives Consumers
'Opt Out' Rights, WASH. POST, May 15, 2001, at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/quinn/col
umns/051501.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
sharing of an individual's confidential informa-
tion by financial institutions is commercial
speech. Part IV defines the commercial speech
doctrine and argues that Congress can, and
should, go further to protect the privacy and con-
fidentiality of an individual's personal informa-
tion under the Financial Services Modernization
Act without violating the First Amendment's com-
mercial speech doctrine.
II. THE STATUS OF PRIVACY
The concept of privacy has been reflected
throughout American history. Over one hundred
years ago, in 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis first identified the right to privacy as
"the right to be let alone."5 Central to this con-
cept of privacy is autonomy, the ability to define
and express oneself.6 Eric Jorstad commented
that privacy involved the power to welcome and
exclude others at will. 7 For example, "Whom do
you welcome in your kitchen? In your bedroom?
In the c: drive of your computer?"8 A failure to
recognize privacy could mean that, "what is whis-
pered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops."9
Quinn, Opt Out Rights].
4 Beth Givens, Financial Privacy: The Shortcomings of the Fed-
eral Financial Services Modernization Act, Presentation before
the California Bar Association, Sept. 15, 2000, at http://
www.privacyrights.org/ar/fin-privacy.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2003) [hereinafter Givens].
5 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Bran-
deis].
6 Eric Jorstad, The Privacy Paradox, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1503, 1505 (2001) [hereinafterJorstad].
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 193-95.
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A. The Right of Privacy
Soon after Warren and Brandeis' ideas started
to spread, courts began to react to the idea of pri-
vacy. In 1905, Pavesich v. New England Life Insur-
ance Co. became the first case to recognize privacy
as an independent right.'" Since then, almost
every state has taken steps to protect the right to
privacy through various provisions in the United
States Constitution."I
The United States Supreme Court has held that
the liberty rights within the Constitution provide a
basis for protecting privacy.12 The landmark case
of Griswold v. Connecticut13 held that marital rela-
tionships lie within "a zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees."' 4
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the
right to privacy extended to a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 15 The
right of decisional privacy has since been ex-
tended to marriage,"! contraception,' 7 family re-
lationships,18 and education.'9
Constitutional privacy has also embraced the
sanctity of the home through the Fourth Amend-
ment, which has been interpreted to mean that
individuals have a right to be free from unreason-
10 122 Ga. 190, 214, 50 S.E. 68, 78 (1905) (finding that
the use of an individual's name and picture in an advertise-
ment was an invasion of privacy).
'' Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Com-
mercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV.
1395, 1405 (1987) [hereinafter Graham].
12 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683
(1977) (noting that one aspect of liberty is the right to per-
sonal privacy); Mike Hatch, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Cen-
tuy: The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal
Information From Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2001) [hereinafter Hatch].
13 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law prohibit-
ing the use and dissemination of information about the use
of contraceptives).
14 Id. at 485.
15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
This right of privacy, whether it be fotnded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and re-
strictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy.
Id.
16 See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(holding that statutes adopted to prevent marriage solely on
the basis of racial classification violated the equal protection
and due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that
statutes permitting married individual to obtain contracep-
tives to prevent pregnancy but prohibiting single people
able searches and seizures. 20 The Supreme Court,
in Frisby v. Schulz, recognized that the privacy of
the home is "of the highest order in a free and
civilized society."'2 1
Throughout the historical development of the
right of privacy, the Supreme Court has found
three categories of privacy that the majority of
cases have fit into: (1) decisional privacy, (2) phys-
ical privacy, and (3) informational privacy. 22 Deci-
sional privacy encompasses the ability of an indi-
vidual to make decisions independently and act
free from intervention or regulation.23 Physical
privacy is tied to the Fourth Amendment's guar-
antee to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.2 4 In 2002, with the massive amounts of
data collected about an individual's transactions
on a daily basis, it is an individual's informational
privacy that is at great risk.25 According to Eugene
Volokh, a UCLA law professor, informational pri-
vacy is, "my right to control your communication
of personally identifiable information about
me."
26
B. Informational Privacy
The right to informational privacy was first ad-
from obtaining them for the same purpose violated the equal
protection clause).
"I Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(finding that there is a private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter).
'9 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
(finding that parents and guardians have the right and duty
to direct the upbringing and education of the children
under their control to prepare children for additional obliga-
tions).
2o U.S. CONsr. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects not only places, but people from unreasonable
search and seizure); Hatch, supra note 12, at 1463.
21 Frisby v. Schulz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
22 See generally John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning,
Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns-Drafting the Biometric
Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97 (1997) (providing back-
ground and historical information about the development of
privacy in the United States).
23 Thomas B. Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy:
The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns,
7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 975, 979 (1999).
24 Id. at 979-82.
25 See, e.g., Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace:
Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1153 (1997) (providing background information on
how privacy may be invaded through the use of technology,
such as the Internet).
216 Eugene Volkh, Freedom of Speech and information Privacy:
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking
About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1050-51 (2000).
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dressed by the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe.2 7
In Whalen, the plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy
by a statute that required pharmacists and doctors
to report prescriptions of drugs that were known
to be abused.28 These prescription reports were
collected and stored in a centralized computer
file.29 The Court upheld the statute, finding that
it was a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power to control the distribution of potentially
dangerous drugs.30 The Court did, however state:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal informa-
tion in computerized data banks or other massive gov-
ernment files.... The right to collect and use such data
for public purposes is typically accompanied by a con-
comitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwar-
ranted disclosures.
1
'
Four months after Whalen, the Supreme Court
addressed informational privacy in Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of General Services.3 2 President Richard
Nixon challenged, as violating his privacy, the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva-
tion Act, which allowed archivists to review and
classify presidential papers and return those that
were determined to be of a personal nature to Mr.
Nixon.33 The Court concluded that Mr. Nixon's
privacy claim was weak, the public's interest in dis-
closure was strong, and that there were safeguards
against abuse built into the Presidential Record-
ings and Materials Preservation Act.34
Despite the fact that the statutes in question
were upheld, the majority of cases have inter-
preted Whalen and Nixon as supporting the pro-
position that there is a right to informational pri-
vacy.35 The concept of privacy centers around the
notion of protecting an individual's right to de-
fine one's self.3"' Central to the creation of one's
identity, there is an inward and outward focus of
personhood.3 7 According to one commentator,
27 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
28 Id. at 591-93. The drugs included amphetamines, co-
caine, methadone, methaqualone, and opium. Id. at 593 n.8.
29 Id. at 591-93.
30 Id. at 596-605.
31 Id. at 605.
32 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
33 Id. at 429.
34 Id. at 465.
35 See generally Francis S. Chlapowski, The Constitutional
Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REiv. 133, 149
(1991) (discussing the development of informational privacy
through Whalen) [hereinafter Chlapowski].
36 See Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and
Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right
to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 479 (1990) (pro-
Francis Chlapowski, "The inward focus of per-
sonhood is concerned with activities or decisions
that affect only the actor. The outward focus of
personhood.... is concerned with the individual
identity which the world perceives."38 When pri-
vate information is not afforded protection and is
disseminated publicly, it may shape the social
identity of the individual, and thus have an impact
on the actual identity the individual develops.3 9 It
is therefore necessary to allow an individual to
control the dissemination of information about
one's self.
C. Computers and Privacy
Computers have enhanced the ability of indi-
viduals and companies to collect, store, organize,
and disseminate information rapidly and with
great ease. The government and the private sector
use computers to collect personal information. 4 °1
Computers have created new ways to combine in-
formation, thus enabling the companies to create
profiles of almost every individual. 4 I These
profiles are easily transferable from one person or
company to another and have become valuable
commodities. 42
1. Profiling
Computers and sophisticated software enable
computer operators who have "access to two or
more databases to identify people on both files,
discard duplicative information, and combine the
rest to create a more informative entry."43 These
large databases allow companies to discover atti-
tudes and interests of individuals to aid targeting
advertisements. 4 4
In addition, the development of the Internet
viding a thorough review of the development of the right to
informational privacy and its current status under the law).
.'7 Chlapowski, supra note 35, at 151.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 154. Informational privacy is an element of per-
sonhood and is an essential element of an individual's iden-
tity. The disseminations of personal information takes the
opportunity away from individuals to define themselves. Id.
41 Graham, supra note 11, at 1395.
41 Id. at 1402.
42 Chlapowski, supra note 35, at 158 (arguing that the
right to control personal information should be controlled
by the individual as property and should not be bought and
sold on the market).
4_3 Graham, supra note 11, at 1400-01.
44 Id. at 1401. Computers are used to remember names,
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has made an even greater amount of information
available. The Internet invades privacy in very sub-
tle ways that the individual user may not even be
aware of.45 In a study on Internet privacy, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC") determined that
as an individual begins to browse the Internet,
companies begin to gather information about
them through "registration pages, user surveys,
and online contests, application forms, and order
forms."46 These methods are considered to be ac-
ceptable methods of gathering information be-
cause they require the active participation of the
user.47 However, there are also a variety of meth-
ods of collecting data that the user is not even
aware of, such as the use of "cookies." 48
The FTC defines a "cookie" as technology that
"allows a Web site's server to place information
about consumer's visits to the site on the con-
sumer's computer in a text file that only the Web
site's server can read."49 This enables a Web site
to assign a unique identifier to the user to recog-
nize the same user on a subsequent visit. 50 Cook-
ies pose a number of privacy concerns. First, once
the cookie on a hard drive is accessed, it reveals a
list of the Web sites the user has visited within a
specified period of time.5' This list may contain
the personal information the user entered while
visiting a previous site, such as passwords, e-mail
addresses, or purchases made.52 Second, many
cookies have the ability to determine the exact lo-
cation of the computer being used.53 Companies
are thus able to send the users offers and adver-
tisements based upon the collection of cookie in-
formation about the user's interests. -5 4
The use of the Internet and cookies has led to a
rise in on-line profiling, which is "the practice of
collecting information about consumers' inter-
ages, attitudes, and interests and opinions and try to predict
customer buying behavior. Id.
45 Rachel K. Zimmerman, The Way the "Cookies" Crumble.:
Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty First Century, 4
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'V 439, 441 (2000-2001) [hereinaf-
ter Zimmerman].
46 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to
Congress, June 1998, at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/
toc.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter 1998 Privacy
Report].
47 Id.
48 Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 442.
49 1998 Privacy Report, supra note 46, at n.4.
50 Id.
51 Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 443.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 443-44.
ests, gathered primarily by tracking their move-
ments online, and using the resulting consumer
profiles to create targeted advertising on web
sites." 5 5 The focus of the companies engaged in
on-line profiling is to gather as much information
as possible about individuals to target consumers
and aid in personal marketing.56
When this personal information is used prop-
erly it has the ability to aid consumers' exper-
iences. Consumers may receive valuable discounts
on products that they usually purchase, 57 and
companies may save time and money by offering
products and services only to consumers who are
truly interested. 58
The concern over profiling centers around the
unknown factor of who is following an individ-
ual's transactional records and sharing this infor-
mation without any consent from the individual
involved. 5 ' The knowledge that every transaction
made could provide an unknown person with a
partial picture into their private life is unsettling.
According to Minnesota Attorney General Mike
Hatch, "These pieces of information, when
layered on top of one another, create a complete
picture of each individual. '" 61
The information obtained through computer
databases and on-line profiling is not confined to
merely demographic data. In 1999, Forbes Maga-
zine ran a story in which one of its reporters,
Adam Penenberg, challenged a Web detective
agent, Dan Cohn, to investigate him. In the
course of six days:
he was able to uncover the innermost details of my life
- whom I call late at night; how much money I have in
the bank; my salary and rent. He even got my unlisted
phone numbers, both of them ..... America, the coun-
try that made "right to privacy" a credo, has lost its pri-
vacy to the computer.
6
'
54 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Privacy in Cyberspace:
Rules of the Road for the Information Superhighway, at http://
www.privacyrights.org/fs/fsl8-cyb.htm (last modified July
2002).
55 Scott Foster, Online Profiling Is on the Rise: How Long
Until the United States and the European Union Lose Patience With
Self-Regudation?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 258 (2000)
[hereinafter Foster].
56 See Hatch, supra note 12, at 1471; see also Lynie Arden,
Privacy Fears Online, eRef.net, at http://www.eref.net/pri-
vacy/features/fears_online.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2003)
[hereinafter Arden].
57 Hatch, supra note 12, at 1474.
58 Foster, supra note 55, at 262-63.
59 Id. at 262.
61 Hatch, supra note 12, at 1471.
61 Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FORBES, Nov.
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This investigation also revealed that private in-
formation is available for sale to anyone for a very
small price: an unlisted phone number for forty-
nine dollars; a Social Security number for forty-
nine dollars; a bank balance for forty-five dollars;
a driving record for thirty-five dollars; tracing a
cell phone number for eighty-four dollars. 2 This
information may be used for valid, unobjection-
able purposes, such as verifying employment, but
this information may also be used for improper
purposes.
2. The Rise of Identity Theft
Identity theft is among the "fastest growing fi-
nancial crimes" in America6 3 with more than
500,000 victims each year.6 4 Identity theft occurs
"when an individual appropriates another's name,
address, Social Security number, or other identify-
ing information to commit fraud."65 It is very easy
for criminals to obtain personal information. In
public places, identity thieves may watch you at
the automatic teller machine ("ATM") as you
punch in the personal identification number or
they may listen to telephone conversations for a
credit card number.6 6 Some identity thieves may
even go through the trash to obtain records that
reveal your name, address, and telephone num-
ber.6 7 They may also simply intercept your mail if
it is kept in a location that is readily available to
the public.68
The increased use of computers has enabled
the Internet to become a valuable source for iden-
tity thieves. 69 The Internet is a tool that has made
it easier and cheaper to access data on just about
29, 1999, at 182.
62 Id.
63 Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the
Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REv. 89, 89 (2001).
64 Identity Theft and Pretext Calling, OCC Advisory Let-
ter, AL 2001-4, (Apr. 30, 2001) [hereinafter OCC Advisory
Letter].
(5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PREPARED STATEMENT OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON "IDENTITY THEFT" BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, TERRORISM AND Gov-
ERNMENT INFORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE, May 20, 1998, at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/1998/9805/identhef.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF THE FTC ON "IDENTITY THEFT"].
66 Ruby Bayan, Avoiding Identity Theft, eRef.net, at http://
www.eref.net/privacy/fact-sheets/avoiding-identity-theft.
asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Bayan]; DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, IDENTITY THEFT AND FRAUD, at http://www.
usdoj.gov/ctiminal/fraud/idtheft.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2003) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE].
anyone.7 11 Not only can identity thieves use the In-
ternet to obtain personal information about indi-
viduals, it is also possible to use the Internet to
perpetrate the fraud with little risk of detection
because the thief is never seen.71 Once they have
obtained an individual's name and credit card
number, they can make use of it through on-line
shopping.72 The identity thief is not seen; they do
not have to be verified; and they do not have to
sign anything.7 3
Credit bureaus, the computerization of public
records, and information brokers have also made
it easier to obtain personal information. Credit
bureaus provide credit reports, often including
one's name, birth date, Social Security number,
address, credit accounts and other public record
information to credit grantors in an effort to help
in determining whether to approve a loan.7 4
3. Public Records
Computerization of government public records
has made information easier to access. Many
states consider driver's licensing files to be public
records.7 5 Driving records generally contain the
individual's full name, birth date, and address.
Some states even use an individual's Social Secur-
ity number as the license number.76 In addition,
voter registration, property records, and many
court records are readily available. Beth Givens,
director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, has
explained that, "[w]hen bits and pieces of infor-
mation are gathered from several sources, the
brevity of some of those pieces can be mislead-
ing."'77 When compiling the bits and pieces of in-
67 Bayan supra note 66; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE supra
note 66.
68 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 66.
69 Id.
70 Arden, supra note 56.
71 Robert O'HarrowJr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Informa-
tion Age, at http://www.washtech.com, May 31, 2001 [herein-
after O'Harrow].
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Stephanie Byers, The Internet: Privacy Lost, Identities Sto-
len, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 141, 144 (2001) [hereinafter Byers].
75 Id.
76 STATEMENT OF FTC ON "IDENTITY THEFT," supra note
65. The Social Security number is the piece of information
that aids the identity theft the most because it allows access to
the individual's financial information. Id.
77 Beth Givens, Public Records in a Computerized Network En-
vironment: Privacy Implications, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
First Amendment Coalition Conference, at http://www.pri
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formation from various public records, the accu-
mulated data may be sorted in many different
ways to essentially create new records, which may
be used for any range of reasons "beyond the orig-
inal public policy reason for collecting them."7 8 It
is the totality of this information and how it is
used that poses the greatest threat to an individ-
ual's privacy.79
4. Information Brokers
Information brokers make use of numerous
databases, public records, and credit headers"
sold by credit reporting agencies. The brokers
then sell the accumulated data to individuals in
search of information.8' When the brokers sell
the reports on-line, they have no way to verify the
identity of the person seeking the information.8 "2
According to Brad Blower, the Assistant Director
of the Financial Practices Division at the FTC,
"[a]lthough information brokers provide a legiti-
mate service, we are concerned that bad actors
and practices by some in the industry may be fuel-
ing identity theft."8 .3 For the identity thief, this
makes the Internet the ideal location to commit
the crime.
5. Impact of Identity Theft
Identity theft impacts individual victims, banks,
and credit grantors.8 4 Identity thieves may open
credit card accounts and apply for loans under
the victim's name and never pay the bill; they may
open checking accounts and write bad checks; or
obtain goods or establish services that the identity
vacyrights.org/ar/speechl.htm (Sept. 23, 1995) (last visited
Feb. 1, 2003).
78 Id.
7 ) Id.
80 STATEMENT OF FTC ON "IDENTITv THEF-r," supra note
65. Credit header information is identifying information,
which includes the name, address, Social Security number,
and telephone number of the individual. This information is
printed at the top of the credit report. Id.
81 Byers, supra note 74, at 144.
82 O'Harrow, supra note 71.
8" Id.
84 McKelvey, supra note 1, at 1085.
85 DEPARTMENT OFJusTcE, supra note 66.
86 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1643(a)(1)(B)
(2000), implemented by Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226 (2002).
87 STATEMENT OF FTC ON "IDENTITY THEFT," supra note
65.
88 McKelvey, supra note 1, at 1112.
89 Id.; see also OCC Advisory Letter, supra note 64, at 11
thief would not be able to obtain using her real
name.8" Currently, federal law limits consumer li-
ability for credit card fraud to fifty dollars per ac-
count,"'! making the financial institution and
credit grantor appear to be the primary victim of
identity theft because they suffer the direct finan-
cial loss.8 7 But this view ignores the impact on the
individual whose identity has been misappropri-
ated. Victims of identity theft are left with the bur-
den of spending "thousands of dollars and hun-
dreds of hours"'88 trying to restore their credit his-
tory and prevent any further misuse of their infor-
mation. ' ) As the victims and costs of identity theft
grew in number,9" Congress was faced with the
challenge of trying to protect individuals' per-
sonal information while trying to modernize the
financial industry.
III. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
MODERNIZATION ACT
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton
signed into law the Financial Services Moderniza-
tion Act, commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act ("GLB Act" or "Act"). 9 1 This law, which
became effective on July 1, 2001, was a widely de-
bated piece of legislation mainly due to the pri-
vacy provisions contained within it.92
A. Background Reasons for Passing the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The GLB Act overturned key provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act, ' 3 which had divided the finan-
(explaining the monetary costs and nonmonetary harm suf-
fered by identity theft victims, such as denial of credit).
91 Elizabeth A. Shack, Increasing Reports of Identity Theft in
Maryland Mirror National Problem, THE DAY RECORD, Jan. 25,
2003, at 19A. "Identity theft has been at the top of the FTC's
list of fraud reporting since it was first tracked in 2000. By
2002, it accounted for 43 percent of the fraud complaints to
the commission." Id.
')1 15 U.S.C. §§6801-6809 (1999).
92 Kristina A.K. Hickerson, Consumer Privacy Protection: A
Call for Reform In An Era of Financial Services Modernization, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 781, 781-83 (2001).
9- 1 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, 48 Star.
162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The
Glass-Steagall Act was passed during the Great Depression in
an attempt to restore confidence in the banking industry.
The Act separated the commercial banking industry from in-
vestment banking activities because of the concern that
banks had underwritten unsound securities and had been a
factor in causing the stock market crash of 1929. See generally
[Vol. 11
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cial industry into banking and securities halves. 94
The purpose of the GLB Act was "to enhance
competition in the financial services industry by
providing a prudential framework for the affilia-
tion of banks, securities firms, insurance compa-
nies, and other financial service providers."95 The
Act sought to accomplish this purpose by elimi-
nating the barriers on affiliation between banks,
insurance, and securities industries.916 In eliminat-
ing these barriers, supporters of the act claimed
that the financial industry would be able to pro-
vide one-stop shopping for financial services,
which would create lower interest rates, lower
credit costs, and create more available credit. 97 In
addition, once these three industries affiliated,
they would possess the ability to merge their cus-
tomer information into one single database. 8
Realizing that this ability to share information
could aggravate consumer concerns relating to
the dissemination of their personal financial in-
formation, Congress enacted privacy protection
provisions. It was these privacy provisions that cre-
ated the greatest dispute. 99 There are a number of
reasons why the information disclosed to financial
industries was deemed to warrant protection.
1. Confidentiality of Financial Information
A financial institution owes its customers cer-
tain duties due to the contractual relationship be-
tween the two. 1°0 These duties may be express or
implied, but many courts have been willing to
find that it is an implied term of the contract be-
tween the customer and the bank that the bank
Joseph Jude Norton, Up Against 'The Wall': Glass Steagall and
the Dilemma of a Deregulated (Regulated') Banking Environment,
42 Bus. LAw. 327 (1987) (providing a background and evalu-
ation of the Glass-Steagall Act) [hereinafter Norton].
94 Norton supra note 93, at 327.
95 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-434 (1999).
96 Richard Blackmon, The Financial Services Modernization
Act: The Death of Consumer Privacy, eRef.net, at http://
www.eref.net/pivacy/fact-sheets/death-of privacy.asp (last
visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Blackmon].
97 Id.
98 Id. (claiming that the lower interest rates and credit
costs potentially achieved by the sharing of information may
also create a privacy nightmare).
99 Pamela Yip, One Stop Shopping for Financial Services; Some
Say New Federal Law Can Save Customers Money, but Consumer
Groups Raise Privacy Issues, Ct-ii. TR B., Feb. 22, 2000, at C3.
100 Kristen S. Provenza, Identity Theft: Prevention and Lia-
bility, 3 N.C. Banking Inst. 319, 330 (1999) [hereinafter
Provenza].
101 See, e.g., Barnett Bank of West Fla. v. Hooper, 498 So.
will not disclose account information to third par-
ties without the consent of the customer. 10
1
Aside from the contractual relationship, the
court in Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. found that a duty of confidentiality exists be-
cause of the unique relationship between a bank
and its customers. 10 2 Before a contractual rela-
tionship exists, a person seeking to open an ac-
count or apply for a loan is required to disclose a
wide variety of very personal information. 0 3 This
places the applicant in an inferior position to the
bank, 10 4 which holds itself out as a trusted, se-
cured institution. 0 5 Therefore, the Djowharzadeh
court held that there is an implied duty to keep
the contents of applications confidential. 10 6
2. Information Sharing is a Common Practice
Despite these duties to keep information confi-
dential, information sharing is a common practice
within the financial industry. Financial institu-
tions may enter into marketing agreements with
telemarketers, and as a result of these agree-
ments, telemarketers have access to the bank's
customer information. 10 7 With this access,
telemarketers often receive names, addresses,
phone numbers, Social Security numbers, ac-
count balances and even credit limits.10 8
An example of this was revealed in June of 1999
when the Minnesota Attorney General's Office
filed a lawsuit against U.S. Bank National Associa-
tion and its parent holding company, U.S.
Bancorp for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
2d 923, 925-26 (Fla. 1986) (holding that a bank has an im-
plied contractual duty not to disclose information regarding
customers' accounts); Sun First Nat'l Bank of Lake Wales v.
Stegall, 395 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (rec-
ognizing that banks have an implied contractual duty not to
disclose a depositor's account information to third parties);
McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1090-91 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (holding that banks have an implied contractual duty
to keep customers' bank account information confidential);
Provenza, supra note 100, at 330-335.
102 Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646
P.2d 616, 619-20 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
1()3 Id. at 619.
104 Id.
105 Id. "The precarious position of the borrower and the
relatively superior position of the bank mandates there be a
counterbalancing special duty imposed on the part of the
bank." Id.
106 Id. at 619-20.
107 Hatch, supra note 12, at 1491.
108 Id.
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Act ("FCRA") and state law. 'o9 The lawsuit alleged
that the bank disclosed the names, phone num-
bers, Social Security numbers, account balances,
and credit limits of its customers to
MemberWorks, a telemarketing firm, after telling
them that "all personal information you supply to
us will be considered confidential."'"10 The bank
settled the lawsuit for three million dollars and
ceased participating in the marketing pro-
grams."' Following the lawsuit, a variety of other
financial institutions admitted to engaging in sim-
ilar practices. 12 The practice of banks selling con-
fidential consumer information is contrary to
what the reasonable person would expect and vio-
lates the trust that banks have been given.
Considering all of the technology available and
how easy it is for identity thieves to obtain per-
sonal identifying information, customers expect
financial institutions to demonstrate more care
and respect for the confidential information they
have been entrusted with.' 1' This became appar-
ent as Congress sought to modernize the financial
industry.
B. Privacy Rights Within the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act
The GLB Act states "that each financial institu-
tion has an affirmative and continuing obligation
to respect the privacy of its customers and to pro-
tect the security and confidentiality of those cus-
tomers' nonpublic personal information."'4 This
broad policy statement is to be given effect in
three ways.
First, the agencies that the Act designates, the
Federal banking agencies, the National Credit
Union Administration, the Secretary of the Trea-
109 See Hatch v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, ND, Civ. Action
No. 99-872 (D. Minn. filed June 9, 1999); FCRA, 15 U.S.C.
§§1681 et seq. (2000); see generally Thomas P. Vartanian &
Robert H. Ledig, 21st Century Money, Banking & Commerce:
State Privacy Litigation, E-Bank Futures (Aug. 31, 1999), at
http://www.ffhsj.com/21stbook/updates/august/august3.
htm (providing a detailed explanation of the allegations
within the complaint).
110 Hatch v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, ND, Civ. Action No.
99-872 (D. Minn. filedJune 9, 1999); Hatch, supra note 12, at
1492.
111 Hatch, supra note 12, at 1492; Press Release, Minne-
sota Attorney General's Office, Minnesota Attorney General
And U.S. Bancorp Settle Customer Privacy Suit, at http://
www.prnewswire.com (June 30, 1999).
112 Hatch, supra note 12, at 1492.
11" Provenza, supra note 100, at 335.
sury, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and the Federal Trade Commission, must estab-
lish standards relating to administrative, technical
and physical safeguards.'' 5 These standards
should allow for the security and confidentiality of
customer records, for the protection against any
dangers or hazards to the security of the customer
records, and for the protection against unautho-
rized access to or use of the customer records." 16
Great care should be taken to prevent any incon-
venience or harm to the customer.' '7
Second, financial institutions must notify the
consumer before disclosing nonpublic personal
information to a nonaffiliated third party. ' This
notice must provide the consumer with the op-
portunity to opt-out of the sharing of this infor-
mation with nonaffiliated third parties." 19 Ac-
count numbers may not be disclosed for the pur-
poses of telemarketing, direct mail, or other elec-
tronic mail marketing. 12 0 The only exception to
the nondisclosure of account numbers is for con-
sumer reporting agencies. 12
Finally, financial institutions are required to dis-
close their privacy policy when a customer rela-
tionship is established with a consumer. 122 The
disclosure must also be given to each consumer
annually during the continuation of the customer
relationship. 2 -
1. Who Does the Act Apply To?
These provisions apply to any financial institu-
tion, defined as any institution, "the business of
which is engaging in financial activities as de-
scribed in Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956."124 In that regard the GLB Act
authorizes a financial holding company to engage
'"4 15 U.S.C. §6801 (a).
11.5 Id. §6804(a) (1).
116 Id. §6801 (b).
117 Id. §6801 (b) (3).
118 Id. §6802.
119 Id. §6802(b)(1)(B).
120 Id. §6802(d).
121 Id. §6802(e)(6) (A).
122 Id. §6803(a).
123 Id.
124 Id. §6809(3) (a); Section (k)(4) states:
the following activities shall be considered to be finan-
cial in nature: (A) Lending, exchanging, transferring,
investing for others, or safeguarding money or securi-
ties. (B) Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying
against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death,
or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as princi-
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in a wide, and expanding list of activities, ranging
from insurance brokerage and data processing to
various types of Internet services.'125
In an effort to clear up some of the ambiguity
as to what sort of entities would qualify as finan-
cial institutions, the FTC listed a number of enti-
ties it considered to be financial institutions and
subject to the privacy provisions. 126 The list in-
cludes financial companies, credit bureaus, loan
services, mortgage brokers, securities underwrit-
ers, broker-dealers, insurance underwriters and
agents, real estate appraisers, trust companies,
travel agencies, management consultants and
counselors, automobile dealerships, data proces-
sors, and retailers who issue their own credit cards
directly to the consumer, just to name a few. 127
Their activities are under the purview of the GLB
Act regardless of the company's affiliation with a
financial holding company. 128
There is no bright-line test to determining
whether the privacy rules apply. Each individual
company has to evaluate whether it is engaged in
a financial activity. 22 In addition, each company
needs to determine whether its customers or con-
sumers trigger the GLB Act.'30
2. Notice of Privacy Policy Requirement
In order to understand whom a financial insti-
pal, agent, or broker for purposes of the foregoing, in
any State. (C) Providing financial, investment, or eco-
nomic advisory services, including advising an invest-
ment company .... (D) Issuing or selling instruments
representing interests in pools of assets permissible for a
bank to hold directly. (E) Underwriting, dealing in, or
making a market in securities.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§1843(k) (4) (A)-(E) (2000).
125 L. Richard Fischer, Richard G. Stephenson &Joan P.
Warrington, The Evolution of Privacy Rights, 1241 PLI/CoRP.
691, 703-704 (Apr. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Fischer].
126 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy of Consumer Fi-
nancial Information, Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. §313.3(k)(2)(i)-
(xii) (2000) [hereinafter FTC Final Rule]. Although cita-
tions only refer to the FTC's Final Rule, each of the other
agencies designated by Congress with responsibilities under
the GLB Act, promulgated an analogous set of regulations.
See Comptroller of the Currency Final Rules, 12 C.F.R. §40.1
et seq., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Fi-
nal Rules, 12 C.F.R. §216.1 et seq., Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Final Rules, 12 C.F.R. §332.1 et seq., Office of
Thrift Supervision Final Rules, 12 C.F.R. §573.1 et seq., Na-
tional Credit Union Administration Final Rules, 12 C.F.R.
§716.1 et seq.
127 FTC Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.3(k) (2) (i-xii).
128 PaulJ. Polking and Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 28 (2000).
tution must provide notice to, it is important to
understand the difference between a "consumer"
and a "customer" under the GLB Act. l3 1 Under
the GLB Act, a "consumer" is an "individual who
obtains or has obtained a financial product or ser-
vice from [a financial institution] that is to be
used primarily for personal, family or household
purposes, or that individual's legal representa-
tive.' 1 32 A "customer" is a consumer who has a
"continuing relationship" with the financial insti-
tution.133 Under the GLB Act, financial institu-
tions are not required to disclose the privacy pol-
icy if there is no intention of sharing information
with nonaffiliated third parties. 134 Initial privacy
policy disclosures must be given to customers at
the time that a customer relationship is estab-
lished and once a year during the continuation of
the relationship. 1 - 5 This "customer relation-
ship" 1 3 6 is established at the time the financial in-
stitution and the consumer enter into a continu-
ing relationship. 137 The notice must be "clear and
conspicuous"'13 and provided in a manner in
which the consumer can reasonably be expected
to receive the actual notice.'I3 "-
The privacy notice must include the institu-
tion's policy with respect to: the categories of
"nonpublic personal information" that are col-
lected and disclosed; 14° the categories of third
parties to whom nonpublic personal information
129 Robert H. Ledig, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Financial Pri-
vacy Provisions: The Federal Government Imposes Broad Require-
ments to Address Consumer Privacy Concerns, pt. 2.1.1, at http://
www.ffhsj.com/bancmail/bmarts/ecdp-art.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Ledig].
3o Id.
1-1 Therese G. Franzen & Leslie Howell, Financial Privacy
Rules: A Step By Step Guide to the New Disclosure Requirements
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Implementing Regula-
tions, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17, 17-18 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Franzen & Howell].
132 FTC Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.3(e)(1).
133 Id. §313.3(h).
1-14 Franzen & Howell, supra note 131, at 18.
135 Id.; 15 U.S.C. §6803(a).
136 15 U.S.C. §6803(a). The Act does not define a "cus-
tomer relationship."
137 Ledig, supra note 129, pt. 2.1.2.3.1.
138 FTC Final Rule, supra note 125, §313.3(b)(1). ("Clear
and conspicuous means that a notice is reasonably under-
standable and designed to call attention to the nature and
significance of the information in the notice.").
139 Ledig, supra note 126, pt. 2.1.2.2.
140 15 U.S.C. §6809(4) (A). "The term 'nonpublic per-
sonal information' means personally identifiable financial in-
formation-(i) provided by a consumer to a financial institu-
tion; (ii) resulting from any transaction with the consumer or
any service performed for the consumer; or (iii) otherwise
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is disclosed; what information, if any, about for-
mer customers is disclosed and to whom; if non-
public personal information is disclosed to a
nonaffiliated third party, a separate statement of
the categories of information disclosed and the
categories of third parties with whom the institu-
tion has contracted; an explanation of the con-
sumer's right to opt-out of the disclosure of non-
public personal information to nonaffiliated third
parties, including the methods the consumer may
use to exercise that right; any disclosures made
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act;' 41 and the
policies and practices with respect to protecting
the confidentiality and security of nonpublic per-
sonal information. 42
3. Opt-Out of Disclosing Information to
Nonaffiliated Third Parties
The opt-out requirements are set out in Section
502 of the GLB Act. 143 A financial institution may
not disclose directly or through an "affiliate"' 144
any nonpublic personal information to a "nonaf-
filiated third party"'1 5 unless the institution has
informed the consumer of the categories of infor-
mation that would be disclosed and the consumer
is given a reasonable opportunity to exercise the
right to opt-out. 146 Thirty days is generally consid-
ered to be a reasonable amount of time to allow
the consumer to opt-out. 14 7
obtained by the financial institution." Id. Nonpublic personal
information includes any list or grouping of consumers that
was created using nonpublic personal information. Id.
§6809(4)(C)(i). The term nonpublic personal information
also includes the information collected from Internet "cook-
ies." See Fischer, Stephenson & Warrington, supra note 125, at
704.
141 15 U.S.C. §1681a(d) (2) (A) (iii) (relating to the ability
to opt out of disclosing information among affiliates).
142 FTC Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.6(a)(1)-(9).
The institution is not required to provide technical informa-
tion about the specific safeguards in use. It may simply pro-
vide in general terms who is authorized to access the non-
public personal information and whether there are safe-
guards in place to ensure that the policy is followed. Id.
143 15 U.S.C. §6802(b).
144 Id. §6809(6), "The term 'affiliate' means any com-
pany that controls, is controlled by, or is under common con-
trol with another company." Id.
145 Id. §6809(5), "The term 'nonaffiliated third party'
means any entity that is not an affiliate of, or related by com-
mon ownership or affiliated by corporate control with, the
financial institution, but does not include a joint employee of
such institution." Id.
146 Id. §6802(b)(I)(A)-(C); see also Franzen & Howell,
supra note 131, at 21.
The FTC's privacy rule also requires that the
customer be given a reasonable method to opt-
out. 141 For example, the institution may designate
a check-off box in a prominent position on the
opt-out notice; may include a reply form with the
opt-out notice; may provide a toll-free telephone
number the consumer may call to opt-out; or may
provide an electronic method to opt-out if the
consumer has agreed to the electronic delivery of
information. 149 The opt-out notice may be deliv-
ered at the same time as the privacy policy of the
financial institution.' i-5 However, if the opt-out
notice is provided at a later date than the privacy
policy notice, a copy of the privacy policy must be
provided to the consumer again. 15 1
Even if the customer has not exercised the right
to opt-out, the Act prohibits the financial institu-
tion from disclosing account numbers or access
codes to a nonaffiliated third party.15 2 This pro-
tects against telemarketers having direct access to
the customers' accounts.1
53
4. Exceptions
The GLB Act does nothing to prevent informa-
tion sharing among affiliates, which may be done
without giving the consumer any notice or oppor-
tunity to opt-out. 15 4 In addition, a financial insti-
tution may provide nonpublic personal informa-
tion to a nonaffiliated third party to perform ser-
147 PRIVACY RicH-rs CLEARINGHOUSE, PROTECTING FINAN-
CIAL PRIVACY IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: THE BURDEN IS ON You,
at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs24-finpriv.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter PROTECTING FINANCIAL PRI-
VACY].
148 OFFICE OF THE COMPITROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, PRI-
\ACY RULE: SMALL BANK COMPLIANCE GUIDE, pt. III, §F, at 36
(Dec. 2001) [hereinafter SMALL BANK COMPLIANCE GUIDE].
149 See FTC Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.7(a) (2) (B)
(ii)(A)-(D); see also SMALL BANK COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra
note 148, at pt. Il1, §F, at 36. Staff of the agencies responsible
for the supervision of banks and credit unions issued a series
of Frequently Asked Questions to help financial institutions
comply with the privacy regulations of the GLB Act. SeeJoint
Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit
Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency & Office of Thrift Supervision, Guidance on Financial
Privacy (Dec. 12, 2001) at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/general/2001/200112122/default.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
1n' FTC Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.7(c).
151  i.
152 15 U.S.C. §6802(d).
15.'A ld.
154 PROTECTING FINANCIAL PRIVACY, supra note 147.
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vices for or functions on behalf of the financial
institution. 55 These services or functions include
marketing of the financial institution's own prod-
ucts or services or financial products or services
offered pursuant to a joint agreement between fi-
nancial institutions.' 56 The third party, however,
must agree to maintain the confidentiality of the
information. 157
Section 502 also provides for a variety of other
exceptions. A financial institution may, in certain
circumstances, disclose nonpublic personal infor-
mation to nonaffiliated third parties without com-
plying with the notice and opt-out require-
ments. -5 8 The disclosure may be made as neces-
sary to effect a transaction requested by the con-
sumer, or in connection with servicing or process-
ing financial products or services at the request of
the consumer. 5 -' Disclosures may also be made
when servicing the consumer's account, or with
another entity, as part of a private label credit
card program, or a proposed securitization, sec-
ondary market sale, or similar transaction related
to the consumer's transaction. 61°
In addition, the FTC's Final Rule provides that
the notice and opt-out requirements do not apply
when nonpublic personal information is dis-
closed: (1) with the consent of the consumer, so
long as the consumer has not revoked the con-
sent; (2) in an effort to protect the confidentiality
or security of the records; (3) to provide informa-
tion to insurance rate advisory organizations,
guaranty agencies, persons that are assessing the
financial institutions' compliance with industry
standards, and the consumers attorneys, account-
ants, and auditors; (4) to the extent permitted or
required under provisions of law, to law enforce-
ment agencies, a state insurance authority, self-
regulatory organizations, or for an investigation
on a matter related to public safety; or (5) to a
consumer reporting agency in accordance with
155 15 U.S.C. §6802(b)(2).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. §6802(b)(2); FTC Final Rule, supra note 125,
§313.13.
159 FrC Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.14.
160 Id. §6802(e)(l)(A)-(C).
161 F C Final Rule, supra note 126, §313.15; Fair, Credit
Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
162 15 U.S.C. §6805.
163 PROTECTING FINANCIAL PRIVACY, supra note 146.
164 Id.
165 Id.; Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Privacy in Electronic
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.' 6'
5. Enforcement Provisions
The GLB Act assigns authority for enforcing the
subtitle's provisions to the FTC, the federal bank-
ing agencies, the National Credit Union Adminis-
tration, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, according to their respective jurisdictions,
and provides for enforcement of the subtitle by
the States. 162 The GLB Act, however, does not
provide for a private right of action for consumers
to sue the financial institution directly for viola-
tion of the statute."1 3 The consumer must com-
plain to the agency having jurisdiction over them
and that agency may bring a court action against
the financial institution. 16 4 However, some state
laws, such as the Unfair and Deceptive Practice
Laws, may enable the consumer to claim that a
violation of the GLB Act violated other rights
granted to the individual by the state. 65
C. Does the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Protect
the Privacy of Your Information?
Privacy in any context is a complex issue be-
cause what one person considers an invasion of
privacy another person may view as a timely offer-
ing of a beneficial service. However, in today's
marketplace, where it is so easy to collect and
compile large amounts of personal information
for a variety of purposes, consumers should have
the right to control the distribution of their finan-
cial information. 16 6 Although some believe the
current protections are sufficient, 167 the GLB Act
does not go nearly far enough, especially given
that allowing the affiliation of banking, securities,
and insurance industries will only accelerate the
sharing of private data.' 68 Most of the shortcom-
ings of the GLB Act have to do with the consum-
Commerce: As the Millenium Approached, Minnesota Attacked, Reg-
ulators Refrained, and Congress Compromised, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHiCS & PUB. PoL'v 821, 882 (2000) [hereinafter
Budnitz].
166 Robert O'Harrow Jr., Night and Day, Computers Collect
Information, WASH. POST, May 16, 2001, at G10.
167 145 CONG. REC. S13, 786 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Phil Gramm) (commenting that the full
disclosure requirement of the institution's privacy policy is
the ultimate protection of privacy); 145 CONG. REc. S13, 876
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Chuck Hagel)
(noting that more privacy provisions would be harmful to fi-
nancial institutions).
168 See Givens, supra note 4.
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ers' inability to control how their financial infor-
mation is used. 169
Pursuant to Section 508 of the GLB Act, the
federal banking regulators and the FTC are cur-
rently requesting comments to study the actual in-
formation sharing practices among financial insti-
tutions and their affiliates. 170 The study addresses
the purposes for sharing customer information
with both affiliated and nonaffiliated third par-
ties; the extent and adequacy of the security mea-
sures implemented to protect confidential cus-
tomer information; the potential risk to the pri-
vacy of the customer created by information shar-
ing; the potential benefits to financial institutions
and customers from information sharing; the suf-
ficiency of existing privacy laws and the adequacy
of financial institutions' privacy policies and dis-
closures; the opportunity for different approaches
for consumers to protect their privacy; and the
possibility of further restrictions on the sharing of
information. 171 The results of this study may have
an impact on some of the current shortcomings
of the GLB Act addressed below. 172
1. The Act Does Not Prevent the Sharing of
Information Among Affiliates
Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama was one of
the strongest opponents of the privacy provisions
of the GLB Act, stating "[u] nder this bill, the con-
sumer has little, if any, ability to protect the trans-
fer of his or her personal nonpublic financial in-
formation."'17  The failure of the opt-out to apply
to affiliate sharing and the many exceptions to the
opt-out provisions provide very little protection of
a consumer's nonpublic personal information. 174
169 Id.
170 Department of the Treasury, In re Public Comment
for Study on Information Sharing Practices Among Financial
Institutions and Their Affiliates, Notice and Request for Com-
ments, 67 Fed. Reg. 7213 (Feb. 15, 2002).
171 Id. at 7214 (requiring the receipt of all responses by
Apr. 1, 2002).
172 Federal Trade Commission, In re Standards for Safe-
guarding Customer Information, Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part
314 (2002). The Final Rule requires "each financial institu-
tion to develop a written information security program that is
appropriate to its size and complexity, the nature and scope
of its activities, and the sensitivity of the customer informa-
tion at issue." Id.
173 145 CONG. REC. S13, 883, 894 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Richard Shelby).
174 Id.; ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, THE
GRAMM-LEACHi-BLnEY AcT, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
Privacy advocates argue that increased affilia-
tion will result in greater dissemination of infor-
mation. 175 Financial institutions may share their
consumer information with their affiliates without
consent from the individual whose information is
involved. The consumer does not even have the
right to opt out of this affiliate sharing. 176 Beth
Givens, director of the Privacy Rights Clearing-
house, argues that affiliate sharing is "no different
than third party sale in terms of the final results.
The fact that a law has been passed enabling the
affiliation of these three industries does not some-
how magically make the sharing of customer data
between and among these industries benign and
without harmful effect."' 7 7 Making it legal to
share the sensitive information that these three
industries possess does not erase the potential for
fraud and profiling. 17
The GLB Act also has another very important
hole in it. While affiliates may have access to an
individual's nonpublic personal information, the
individual does not.171 The GLB Act does nothing
to provide the consumer with the opportunity to
access the information that the financial institu-
tion has compiled.18 Although the consumer may
dispute any nonpublic personal information that
has been shared, the consumer has no opportu-
nity to correct any inaccuracies. 18
2. The Protections Provide For Opt-Out, Not Opt-In
One of the issues that had been highly debated
during the drafting of the privacy sections of the
GLB Act was whether to adopt an opt-in or an opt-
out provision. 1 8 An opt-out provision does not re-
quire true consent for the dissemination of per-
glba.html (last modified Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter ELEC-
TRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER].
175 Symposium: The Future of Law and Financial Services:
Panel I1: The Policy Aspect, Consumer Data Privacy, 6 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 69, 77-78 (2001).
176 PROTECI'ING FINANCIAL PRIVACY, supra note 147.
177 Givens, supra note 4.
178 Id.
179 Budnitz, supra note 165, at 888.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 See 145 CONG. REC. E2363, E2364 (Daily Ed. Nov. 11,
1999) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (contending that opt-
out provision does not protect privacy of consumers); 145
CONG. REC. S13, 783, 789 (Daily Ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (statement
of Sen. Paul Sarbanes) (contending that without a consent
provision, the privacy protections are weak).
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sonal information. With the opt-out system, infor-
mation may be shared until the consumer tells the
institution to keep their information confidential.
Failure to exercise the right to opt-out is passive;
the consumer may not have seen the privacy no-
tice that included the opt-out disclosure, or the
consumer may simply have forgotten to make the
necessary phone call or mail the necessary let-
ter. 1
83
Privacy advocates favor an opt-in system as op-
posed to the opt-out procedure. Under an opt-in
system, information remains private unless the
consumer consents to the information being
shared.184 An opt-in requires an affirmative act.
This is much stronger proof of the consumer's ac-
tual intent. An opt-in system would offer the con-
sumer an opportunity to give meaningful con-
sent.185 Most consumers do not reasonably expect
that the information provided to obtain a bank ac-
count or a loan is going to be collected and
shared.186 The opt-in system would simply require
the financial institution to obtain consent before
sharing this information. If the institution has a
valid, worthwhile purpose, the institution must ex-
plain the benefits of giving consent, which should
not be difficult to obtain if there is a definite ben-
efit. 18 7 An opt-in system would also help to avoid
wasteful marketing to uninterested customers.' 88
The opt-in identifies the consumers who are favor-
ably disposed to marketing because they have ex-
ercised their right to be placed in a database to
183 Quinn, Opt Out Rights, supra note 3.
184 Hatch, supra note 12, at 1494.
185 William Safire, Stop Cookie-Pushers, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2000, at A27.
186 See Quinn, Money Safer Than Your Privacy, supra note
2.
187 Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default
Rules, MINN. L. REV., 1219, 1243-44 (2002) [hereinafter
Janger & Schwartz].
188 See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Infor-
mation: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2406-
08 (1996) [hereinafter Murphy].
189 See id. at 2406.
190 See id.
191 Internet Marketers Vote in Favor of Opt-In Email: NetCrea-
tions Inc. Sponsors Key Internet Marketing Surveys, Bus. WIRE,
Mar. 9, 2000.
192 Id.; see Carol Patton, Weaving Your E-Mail Marketing
Web: Mass Mailing Done Right Can be Golden, But Done Wrong,
It'sjust Spam, CRAIN's DETROIT Bus., June 12, 2000, at El.
193 ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note
174.
194 Blackmon, supra note 96.
195 The American Bar Association ("ABA") challenged a
receive such information. 89 Institutions would
then have more accurate information to make
their marketing more efficient.' 90
One Internet-based marketing company, Net-
Creations, Inc., has concluded that making use of
the opt-in approach, with an opportunity to opt-
out when the consumer receives a marketing mes-
sage, is most effective.' 9 ' Giving the individual
control is the best way to market materials and
maintains the customer's goodwill. 92
Under the current system, the burden of pro-
tecting the privacy of nonpublic personal infor-
mation rests on the consumer. 193 Unless the con-
sumer specifically informs every organization she
does business with that she does not want them to
share information, the organization is permitted
to do so. 194
3. The Definition of a Financial Institution is
Unclear
While the GLB Act defines a financial institu-
tion broadly, including businesses not tradition-
ally considered related to the banking industry, 9 5
the definition may be underinclusive given the
"overlapping nature of e-commerce, which often
involves financial institutions and other busi-
nesses." 196 The GLB Act imposes no duties upon
Web businesses that are not financial institutions
as defined by the Act, or those that do not share
information with financial institutions. Web sell-
decision of the FTC that lawyers and law firms may, in many
instances, be financial institutions within the meaning of the
GLB Act and therefore required to comply with the privacy
policy notices provision. See Scott Daniels, Read This Please!
(At Least Some Of It), 15 UTAH BARJ., 6 (June/July 2002). The
ABA tried to argue that an exemption was appropriate for
lawyers and law firms because Congress did not intend to reg-
ulate the legal profession through the GLB Act and that ex-
isting rules of professional responsibility provide greater pro-
tection to consumers than the GLB Act would when applied
to lawyers and law finns. See Letter from Martha W. Barnett,
President of the American Bar Association, to Timothy J.
Muris, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, at http:/
/www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/ababarnett010710.pdf (July 10,
2001). The FTC, however, denied these requests stating,
"The Act does not provide the Commission with express au-
thority to grant exemptions from the other provisions of the
GLB Act, including the initial and annual notice provisions."
See Letter from J. Howard Beales, Director of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection of the FTC, to Robert E. Hirshon and
Robert D. Evans, Governmental Affairs Office of the Ameri-
can Bar Association (Apr. 8, 2002) at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2002/04/hirshon-bealesO2O4O8.pdf.
196 Budnitz, supra note 165, at 870.
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ers are not considered financial institutions unless
the seller itself has issued a credit card to the con-
sumer. 197 However, the consumer most likely has
expectations that information relating to the
purchase is confidential whether or not the
purchase is from a financial institution or a Web
seller. 19
4. The Privacy Notices are Inadequate
The GLB Act requires that the privacy notices
sent to customers and the disclosure of opt-out
provisions must be made "clearly and conspicu-
ously."199 However, the privacy notices that have
been received have been difficult to understand
and written in a manner that made it difficult to
exercise the option to opt-out. 2 °0 A study of the
readability of the privacy notices was conducted
by Mark Hochhauser for the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse. 20 1 This study found that the pri-
vacy notices were written at a third year college
level or above.20 2 The accepted standard recom-
mended for documents that are intended for the
general public is an eighth grade reading level. 201 3
In addition to being difficult to understand,
they are written in a manner that makes it difficult
to understand how to opt-out.2~1 4 Explanations of
how to opt out generally appear at the end of the
notices, so it is necessary to read through all of
the fine print before learning how to opt out.205
In order to gain attention, the privacy notices
should provide the information on how to opt out
at the beginning of the notice in print that is in-
tended to draw a consumer's attention. 206
i7 Ledig, supra note 129, pt. 2.1.1.
198 See id. at 871.
l 15 U.S.C. §8602(b)(1)(A).
200 Janger & Schwartz, supra note 187, at 1230-31.
201 Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability
of Financial Privacy Notices, at http://www.privacyrights.
org/ar/GLB-Reading.hym (July 2001).
2012 Id.
203 Id.
204 COMMENTS IN TIE MATTER OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
MODERNIZATION ACer OR GRAMM-LEAcH-BLILEY ACr, ELEC.
TRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, THE PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, US PIRG, AND CONSUMERS UNION, Study on
Information-Sharing Practices Among Financial Institutions
and Their Affiliates, 18, May 1, 2002; Janger & Schwartz,
supra note 187, at 1231-21.
2( 5 Janger & Schwartz, supra note 187, at 1231-32.
206 Id. at 1258.
2(07 Brian Krebs, Financial Privacy Elusive in Wake of New
5. Enforcement Mechanisms are Inadequate
The Act also does nothing to curtail the collec-
tion of consumer information. "[A] slew of com-
panies advertising on the Internet and in the
backs of newspapers and legal publications con-
tinue to offer financial information about virtually
anyone for a marginal fee."2 117 The accumulation
and sale of personal information continues even
after the GLB Act, which makes obtaining per-
sonal information under false pretenses and the
theft of financial information subject to fines and
imprisonment.208 Part of the problem is the lack
of enforcement mechanisms. The FTC lacks re-
sources to adequately pursue such information
brokers. 20 9 In November of 1999, the FTC estab-
lished an identity theft hotline and, in the first
month of its implementation logged approxi-
mately 445 phone calls per week.210 In December
of 2001, the weekly average of calls answered was
approximately 3,000 per week.' I Despite the
large volume of consumer complaints, the FTC
has been slow to pursue alleged information bro-
kers. From the time of the hotline's inception to
September of 2000, the commission had only
brought one case against an alleged information
broker212 and in March of 2002, settled charges
against three different information brokers.2 1S
This may be partially due to the fact that govern-
ment agencies are subject to congressional lobby-
ists pressures, which influence the priority placed
upon enforcing the privacy provisions of the GLB
Act.'14
Pursuant to Section 523 of the GLB Act, finan-
cial institutions need to establish security proce-
dures to safeguard consumer information, such as
Privacy Laws, NEWSBYES, Sept. 13, 2000 [hereinafter Krebs].
208 15 U.S.C. §6823.
2(09 Budnitz, supra note 165, at 881-82.
21() Richard M. Stana, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Ap-
pear to be Growing, United States General Accounting Office 4
(GA-02-363) (2002).
211 Id.
212 Krebs, supra note 207.
213 FTC, INFORMATION BROKERS SETTLE FTC CHARGES,
Mar. 8, 2002, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/pretext-
ingsettlements.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). The com-
plaints named Information Search, Inc. of Baltimore, Md.,
Smart Data Systems of Staten Island, N.Y., and Discreet Data
Systems of Humble, Tex. as defendants. Id. Smart Data Sys-
tems and Discreet Data Systems settled for $2,000 each. A
$15,000 payment was suspended against Information Search
based upon financial statements. Id.
214 See Budnitz, supra note 165, at 881-82.
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verification, fraud prevention, and information se-
curity.2 15 While the bank and thrift regulatory
agencies have issued the joint guidelines for safe-
guarding confidential consumer information,2 1 6
there are no required methods to ensure adher-
ence to these policies.2 17 The guidelines list secur-
ity measures for financial institutions to consider
implementing, such as:
(1) identify and assess the risks that may threaten cus-
tomer information; (2) develop a written plan contain-
ing policies and procedures to manage and control
these risks; (3) implement and test the plan; and (4)
adjust the plan on a continuing basis to account for
changes in technology, the sensitivity of customer infor-
mation, and internal or external threats to information
security.
2 1 8
However, a financial institution only needs to im-
plement the security measures it determines to be
appropriate.2 1 9
Verification procedures must be established to
ensure the accuracy of the information given to a
financial institution when new accounts are
opened. For example, institutions could call the
customer to confirm her desire to open an ac-
count or apply for a credit card. Institutions could
also verify information by contacting the em-
ployer listed on the application. 2 11
To prevent the occurrences of fraudulent ad-
dress changes, financial institutions should send a
confirmation of the address change request to the
new address as well as the previous address on the
institution's record. In addition, when a customer
is seeking to open a new account, the financial in-
stitution should take steps to make sure the infor-
mation given has not been associated with fraudu-
lent activity. To do this, the financial institutions
should check the credit reports for a fraud
alert..2
215 Richard Spillenkothen, Identity Theft and Pretext Call-
ing, Supervisory Letter SR 01-11 (SUP), Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/SRLetters/2001/srO111.htm, April 26, 2001,
(last visited Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Spillenkothen]; see
also, John Ginovsky, Pretext Calls: Is Your Staff Equipped to Han-
dle Them Properly, ABA Bankers News, at http://www.privacyto
day.com/bankersnews2.htm Uune 12, 2001).
216 Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Safeguarding Customer Information and Rescission of Year
2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, 66 Fed. Reg. 8616
(Feb. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Interagency Guidelines].
217 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYS-
TEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT SU-
PERVISION, Joint Release, Agencies Adopt Guidelines for Customer
Information Safety (Jan. 17, 2001).
218 Id.
To ensure adherence to these policies, the fi-
nancial institutions should have written proce-
dures on how to open an account and regular
training to make sure that employees follow the
procedures . 222 Part of the established procedures
should limit the circumstances under which a
consumer's information is revealed over the tele-
phone and encourage the institution's employees
to report attempts to open accounts using an-
other individual's information. 223
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENTS
At least twenty-five states have considered enact-
ing greater privacy protections than those pro-
vided by the GLB Act. 224 At the time the GLB Act
was being considered by Congress, there were a
number of other bills before Congress, which
would have provided increased protection for pri-
vacy.22 5 However, when there is a claim that an in-
dividual's privacy is being invaded and the action
invading that privacy involves speech, writing, or
other communicative media, there is a tension
with First Amendment rights.2 26 An evaluation of
the First Amendment may explain why Congress
was hesitant to further control the collection and
dissemination of personal information. However,
as these next sections will demonstrate, the First
Amendment is not a bar to heightened protection
of consumer's personal information.
A. Background
The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or
219 Id.
220 Spillenkothen, supra note 215.
221 Id.
222 Id.; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS AND CUSTOMER DATA: COMPLYING WITH THE SAFE-
GUARDS RULE, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/bus
pubs/safeguards.htm (Sept. 2002).
223 Id.
224 Budnitz, supra note 165, at 883.
225 Id. at 884-89. In addition to other privacy bills in
Congress, roughly half of the states introduced privacy bills
that would grant stronger privacy protection than the GLB
Act. As of now, however, all of these bills have failed to be
approved by the state legislators because of strong opposition
by the financial services industry. See Givens, supra note 4.
226 Scott Shorr, Personal Information Contracts: How to Pro-
tect Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1756, 1795 (1995).
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."2 2 7 The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized "that not all speech is of equal importance.
It is speech on matters of public concern that is at
the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion. ''228 Essentially, First Amendment protections
are extended to communications that involve
public discourse to enable the conveyance of in-
formation necessary for decision making. 229
Most financial institutions would argue that the
collection, use, and dissemination of information
about their consumers is protected by the Consti-
tution as commercial speech, and therefore may
not be subjected to restrictions.2 0  To support this
position, financial institutions would most likely
rely on the Supreme Court's statement, "the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable
... to the proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system [and] to the formation of intel-
ligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated or altered."' 2 '
In addition, to further support the proposition
that the sharing of financial information about a
consumer is commercial speech, financial institu-
tions could rely on Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc.2 1 2 In Dun & Bradstreet, the Su-
preme Court examined credit reports issued by
credit reporting agencies. The Court stated that a
credit report "provided subscribers with financial
and related information about businesses."2 3 3
Therefore, consumer reports are only of interest
to the individual and the specific business audi-
ence. 2 4 It was not necessary to provide the credit
227 U.S. CONsTr. amend. 1.
228 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985).
229 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) [hereinafter Post].
2301 SeeJorstad, supra note 6, at 1513.
2-11 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
232 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
233 Id. at 751.
234 Id. at 762.
235 Id. at 762-63.
236 Id.; see, e.g., Motor and Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (regulation restricting automo-
bile manufacturers from disseminating maintenance notices
was seen as a restriction on commercial speech but was held
as passing constitutional muster because the regulation of
speech had a reasonable basis in a substantial government
interest); U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)
reports with full First Amendment protection be-
cause the information was not needed to promote
the free flow of information on matters of public
concern. 23 5 The credit reports implicated con-
cerns that argued in favor of the constitutional
protection that commercial speech receives.23"
B. Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court has had some difficulty
coming up with a precise definition of commer-
cial speech.23, 7 According to Robert Post, a profes-
sor of law at the University of California, Berkeley,
"[t]he court [in Thomas v. Collins] 23 8 explicitly
concludes that no simple fact, like the presence of
a business interest or compensation, can distin-
guish commercial from political speech." 3 9 The
Court must therefore determine the nature of the
speech and whether it should be included within
public discourse. 240 The contemporary Court has
preferred a common-sense approach in deciding
where the line should be drawn distinguishing be-
tween commercial speech and public dis-
course.
24 1
The commercial speech doctrine first appeared
in Valentine v. Chrestensen,242 where the Court held
that the First Amendment leaves states free to re-
strict "purely commercial advertising. '" 243 The
Court retreated from this position and gave com-
mercial speech a larger degree of protection in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations.244 In Pittsburgh Press, the Court
stated that subsequent courts have held, "speech
is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that
it relates to an advertisement. '245 The advertise-
ment in question was not granted any First
(disseminating information by telecommunications carriers
about their customers is commercial speech that required
protection because the FCC regulation at issue violated the
First Amendment).
237 Joshua A. Marcus, Commercial Speech on the Internet:
Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO Awrs & ENT. L.J.
245, 258 (1998) [hereinafter Marcus].
238 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
239, Post, supra note 229, at 18.
241) Id. at 20.
241 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
455-56 (1978); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
242 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
243 Id. at 54.
244 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
2451 Id. at 384.
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Amendment protection however, because the ad-
vertisement was for an illegal commercial activ-
ity.24
6
After its holding in Valentine, the Court contin-
ued to narrow its stance in Bigelow v. Virginia.247
Bigelow involved a Virginia newspaper advertise-
ment that described the legality and availability of
abortions in New York.2 48 The Court held that
"speech is not stripped of First Amendment pro-
tection merely because it is published in that form
[paid commercial advertisement]. "249 The mere
presence of a commercial aspect did not elimi-
nate all First Amendment protection. 250
In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion 25 1 that "the Constitution ... accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression. 252 The
protection available for a particular commercial
expression turns on the nature both of the ex-
pression and of the governmental interests served
by its regulation."2 53 Central Hudson established a
four-part test to evaluate the constitutionality of
government regulations on commercial
speech.254 Under the Central Hudson test, a court
must first decide whether the speech is protected
by the First Amendment. 255 The speech must con-
cern a lawful activity, and it must not be mislead-
ing.256 Second, the Court must decide whether
the government has a substantial interest in regu-
lating the speech. 257 Third, if the court finds that
the government interest is. substantial and con-
cerns a lawful activity, the court must decide
whether the regulation materially advances the
government interest.2 58 Finally, the court must de-
cide whether the regulation "is not more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest. '" 259
Given that the information sharing covered by
the GLB Act is commercial speech, Central Hudson
246 Id. at 388.
247 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a law
which made it a misdemeanor to publish abortion advertise-
ments).
248 Id. at 812.
249 Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel.
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
250 Id.
251 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (considering whether the New
York State Public Service Commission could prevent electric
companies from taking part in promotional advertising).
252 Id. at 563 (quoting Ohralik 436 U.S. at 456, 457).
253 Id.
254 Id. at 566; Marcus, supra note 236, at 264-65 (provid-
would apply. In order to determine whether Con-
gress would be able to amend the GLB Act to cre-
ate greater privacy protections, a court would be
required to determine the type of information
that is being collected and disseminated by the fi-
nancial institutions. The most common informa-
tion disclosed to a financial institution is an indi-
vidual's name, address, telephone number, and
Social Security number. The following section will
evaluate whether requiring financial institutions
to obtain affirmative consent from a consumer
before sharing information with an affiliate would
pass constitutional muster.
C. Central Hudson Analysis
The first inquiry under Central Hudson is
whether the speech is lawful and is not mislead-
ing. 260 Neither the financial institution, nor the
consumer, would likely argue that the names, ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, and Social Security
numbers currently shared among affiliates is false
or misleading information.
The second inquiry is whether the government
has a substantial government interest in regulat-
ing the speech. 261 The government's interest in
restricting the dissemination of a consumer's
name, address, telephone number, and Social Se-
curity number without consent to affiliates of a fi-
nancial institution, is to protect the privacy, confi-
dentiality, and security of this information from
becoming subject to misuse, such as identity
theft. 262 Courts have recognized that the protec-
tion of consumer privacy is a substantial govern-
ment interest.263
In response, financial institutions would argue
that protecting consumer privacy does not rise to
the level of a substantial government interest by
relying on U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications
ing historical development of the commercial speech doc-
trine).
255 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
256 Id. The state may not regulate speech that does not
pose a danger to the asserted government interest. Id. at 565.
257 Id. at 566.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 See OCC Advisory Letter, supra note 64.
263 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
625 (1995) (protecting consumers from unwanted solicita-
tion); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993) (protect-
ing consumers from unwanted solicitation).
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Commission.264 In U.S. West, an FCC order required
telecommunications carriers to obtain customer
approval before using or disclosing phone
records.26 5 The court was noticeably concerned
because the FCC had not stated the specific pri-
vacy harm that it sought to protect against.2 16
While analyzing nonpublic personal information,
Congress and consumers have a specific harm to
combat under the GLB Act, the violation of a
stated purpose of the Act, the "continuing obliga-
tion to respect the privacy of its customers and to
protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers' nonpublic personal information. "21 7
Financial institutions may also argue that the
costs of restricting the sharing of information
among affiliates would outweigh the government
interest. Richard Kovacevich, the President and
Chief Executive Officer of Wells Fargo & Co., a
diversified financial services company, states that,
"[t] he more privacy we have, the slower we will be
in responding to customers' requests for credit
and the less able we will be to identify products
that best suit our customers' needs." 268 Thus, fi-
nancial institutions would argue that restricting
the use and transfer of information contradicts
the purpose of the Act, which is to allow financial
institutions to provide efficient service.26 1 How-
ever, Trans Union Corp. v. F]'C2 7 1 has already de-
termined that the protection of the privacy of
consumer credit history is a substantial govern-
ment interest.27 1
The third inquiry under Central Hudson is
whether the regulation would materially advance
264 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999); see generally Andrew
Dymek, A Clash Between Commercial Speech and Individual Pri-
vacy: U.S. West v. FCC, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 603 (2000) (provid-
ing a detailed analysis of U.S. West v. FCC and issues relating
to First Amendment and privacy conflicts).
265 U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1228.
216 Id. at 1235. The court stated that it could infer the
privacy harm §222 sought to protect against. The Court held
that the government asserted a substantial state interest be-
cause it sought to protect people from the disclosure of sensi-
tive and potentially embarrassing personal information. Id. at
1235-36.
267 15 U.S.C. §6801 (a).
2668 Richard M. Kovacevich, Privacy and the Promise of Fi-
nancial Modernization, TH4E REGION, Special Issue 2000, at
http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/00-03/kovacevich.
html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002). Wells Fargo & Co. provides
banking, estate planning, insurance, investment, and mort-
gage and consumer financing. See Wells Fargo, WELLS FARGO
TODAY, Fourth Quarter 2001, at http://www.wellsfargo.com/
about/todayl.jhtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
269 U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP ("PIRG"),
WHAT IS THE GRAMM-LEACii-BLILEY FINANCIAL SERVICES MoD-
the government interest.2 72 To require affirmative
consent from a consumer before disseminating
nonpublic personal information among affiliates
does not deny a financial institution use of the
nonpublic personal information. Consent would
simply require the financial institution to obtain
the consumer's permission before sharing the
nonpublic personal information. If the institution
has a valid purpose for wanting to share the infor-
mation with an affiliate, then the consent should
not be difficult to obtain.27 " The stated purpose of
the Act is to respect the privacy of customers and
the confidentiality of the customers' nonpublic
personal information.274 Regulations that restrict
the use and dissemination of nonpublic personal
information would clearly support this interest.2 75
The final inquiry is whether an opt-in regula-
tion is no more extensive than necessary to ac-
complish the purpose. 276 Under this inquiry, the
regulations must demonstrate "a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that repre-
sents not necessarily the single best disposition,
but one whose scope is in proportion to the inter-
est served." 277 Currently, the Act only requires no-
tice and an opportunity to opt-out of information
disclosure to nonaffiliated third parties.2 78 The
further restriction on sharing nonpublic personal
information among affiliates would simply allow
consumers to retain control over their own infor-
mation. Information given to an institution for
one purpose should not be disseminated to affili-
ated or nonaffiliated third parties without the
consent of the consumer. Therefore, further re-
ERNIZATION ACT OF 1999 AND How DOES INFORMATION SHIAR-
ING; AFFECT YOUR PRIVACY?, at http://www.pirg.org/con-
sumer/privacy/glb.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
270 245 F. 3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that restric-
tion on the speech of a credit reporting agency due to an
FTC ban on the sale of target marketing lists did not violate
First Amendment rights because the government had sub-
stantial interest in protecting the privacy of credit informa-
tion).
271 Id. at 818.
272 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
273 See Murphy, supra note 187, at 2406.
274 15 U.S.C. §6801.
275 U.S. v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428
(1993) (holding that factual evidence is not necessary to es-
tablish that regulations will materially advance the govern-
ment interest where the relation is obvious).
2763 Central Hudson, 446 U.S. at 566.
277 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting v. U.S., 527 U.S.
173, 188 (1999) (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 480 (1989)).
278 15 U.S.C. §6802.
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strictions on the dissemination of nonpublic per-
sonal information without the consent of the con-
sumer would comply with the requirements of the
First Amendment's commercial speech doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current privacy protections implemented
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act are an important
first step in giving notice to the consumer of how
her financial information is being treated by the
financial institution. However, there is still too
much latitude for the use of that information
without the consumer's consent. The use and dis-
semination of information about a consumer,
without her consent, poses a serious threat to the
privacy of her bank account, credit card, and in-
surance policy. Restricting the dissemination of
this information, which many financial institu-
tions consider commercial speech, to affiliated
parties may be accomplished with no damage to
the First Amendment because commercial speech
is not entitled to full First Amendment protection
as indicated by Central Hudson. Due to the in-
creased concern over the commercial use of per-
sonal information and the fact that there is no
damage to the First Amendment in restricting this
speech, legislators should amend the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act to restrict information sharing
among affiliates of financial institutions without
the consent of the consumer.
2003]

